SUPREME COURT, U. S.

APR 22 1972

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM 1971

No. 71-1362

WILLIAM JACOB JOHNSON,
Petitioner,

v.

COMMITTEE ON EXAMINATIONS AND ADMISSIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA,
Respondents,

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA

WILLIAM JACOB JOHNSON, pro se,
1604 East Fremont Drive,
Tempe, Arizona 85282

INDEX

Page

Jurisdiction. 2

Questions Presented For Review. 2

Constitution Provision Involved. 4

Statute and Rules Involved. 4

Statement of Case. 4

Reason Why Certiorari Should Be Granted. . . . 9

Conclusion. 15

Appendix

Order Setting Time For Hearing Petition. . . . . App. 1

Order Denying Petition . . . . . App. 2

Order Granting Filing Of Motion For Reconsideration. . . . . App. 3

Order Denying Motion For Reconsideration. . . . . App. 4

AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases:	Page
Baird v. State of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971)	12
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)	11
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917)	14
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)	13
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963)	13
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971)	14
Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971)	11
Hackin v. Lockwood, 361 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1966)	10
Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1927)	14
Heaney, Application of, 476 P.2d 846 (1970)	14
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884)	14
Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971)	13
Loving v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)	13
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)	12
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971)	12
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964)	13
Murcheson, In re, 349 U.S. 133 (1955)	13

	Page
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)	11
Railroad Com. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941)	15
Sander v. Gray, 203 F. Supp. 158 (1962)	11
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957)	11, 12, 13
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)	13
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)	13, 14
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1941)	13
Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944)	13
South v. Peter, 339 U.S. 276 (1950)	13
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879)	10
Summers, In re, 325 U.S. 561 (1945)	2
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)	10, 11, 13
Constitution:	
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend 14	
Statutes and Rules:	
28 U.S.C. 1257 (3)	2
Arizona Revised Statutes, as amended:	
Vol. 10, ARS § 32-201, 237	4, 10
Vol. 17; Rules of the Supreme Court, Rules 27 & 28	3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 14

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM 1971

No. .....

WILLIAM JACOB JOHNSON,
Petitioner

v.

COMMITTEE ON EXAMINATIONS AND
ADMISSIONS OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA,
Respondents,

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA

To the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States:

Your Petitioner, William Jacob Johnson, hereby petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona denying admission of Petitioner to the State Bar in said State, despite overwhelming evidence that Petitioner and other examinees were discriminated against due to purposeful invidious, unequal, unfair, arbitrary, capricious grade review proceedings by the Committee on Examinations and Admissions of the Supreme Court, before and after announcement of the successful examinees of the State Bar examination, infected, inter alia, by an admitted and perhaps continuing racial favoritism policy and practices.

JURISDICTION

The orders sought to be reviewed were made and entered on January 18, 1972 and on February 29, 1972 concerning the denial of a petition and a timely motion for reconsideration, respectively. There were no opinions. The statuatory provision believed to confer on this Court jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. Section 1257 (3). See also In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Whether the Committee on Examinations and Admissions of the Supreme Court (the Committee) contravened the Due Process and the Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States when on its own secret motion, following the July 1970, February 1971 and July 1971 examinations, it broke the Race and/or Color seal of examination paper confidentiality by photograph or other identification means of only Negro failing examinees, regardless of the severity of their failing grade, then segregated these papers to allow an arbitrary passing standard to apply in a final grade review prior to announcement of the successful examinees.

2. Whether the Committee secret Negro or Black only favoritism policy and practices were invidiously discriminatory and repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment when (a) other accredited law school examinees (e.g., American Indians, Mexican-Americans, Swedish-Americans and other groups) were excluded; (b) in a similar fact Negro final record case, the Committee Chairman admitted the policy was wrongful to "Whites"; (c) failing Negro examinees would be given a "little nudge if they were at the bor-

derline or a little less to help to put them over" when they were "reasonably close to the passing mark, in other words, somewhere above 68.0" percent; and (d) the Committee Chairman said: "I told Doris Odom to give him (a Negro) a passing grade" based upon his answers being of "sufficient quality" despite his failing grade after grading and review under the Race, Color and Creed seal of confidentiality.

3. Whether the Committee deprived Petitioner and other examinees of life, liberty and property without Due Process and the Equal Protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment when (a) examinees, in the past, were automatically passed either at a 69.0 or 69.3 percent level because "there could have been a 1 percent error in grading." despite a Rule requiring 70.0 percent as the minimum passing grade; (b) arbitrary and capricious decisions have recommended special applicants with lower grades than your Petitioner and other examinees after submitting a formal petition for review of examination papers; (c) it said that the Rules are "our guidelines", whereas, Petitioner recognized the same as law, transacted good faith Bar Examination agreements in accordance with the conditions set forth in said Rules, and submitted fees as consideration to said agreements; and (d) a minority attendance participation (i.e., three out of seven) is only required to deny a "Petition for Review of Examination papers of Applicant" as provided by Rule 28(c), XII, E of the Rules of the Supreme Court, in other words, a minority number, even one member according to the evidence may deny a petitioner's right to practice law, a property right.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED

Amendment XIV, United States Constitution, particularly, Sec. 1, cl. 2: ". . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

STATUTE AND RULES INVOLVED

Arizona Revised Statutes, Vol. 10, 32-201, 237; Vol. 17, Rules of the Supreme Court, Rule 27(b), (f), as amended, Rules 28(a), as amended, Committee on Examinations and Admissions, ". . . For such purpose, a committee . . . consisting of seven active members . . . shall be appointed by this Court . . ."; Rule 28(c), II, IV(6), VIII and XII, E., Conduct of hearings, Proceedings Upon Failure to Receive Satisfactory Grade, para. 5, cl. 3, "If at least three members . . . concur . . . that . . . answers . . . were not unfairly graded . . . no further review . . . shall be required of the Committee."

STATEMENT OF CASE

William Jacob Johnson, age 47, a Swedish-American, a three year veteran of World War II, a Bachelor of Science (Chemical Engineering), a former executive of a large copper company for 17 years, a former holder of United States secret clearance, was a member of the Arizona State University College of Law charter graduating class of June 1970. He took the Arizona Bar examination in July 1970 receiving a grade of 68.3 percent and 72.0 percent in ethics. The Rules of the Supreme Court require a minimum grade of 70.0 percent in the general examination and eth-

ics, Rule 28(c), VIII; by unwritten rule, once passed in ethics is sufficient qualification. He next took the February 1971 and July 1971 examinations and had grades of 68.6 and 69.5 percent, respectively. Following the February 1971 examination, he submitted a proposed rule to the Committee on Examinations and Admissions of the Supreme Court (the Committee) which was summarily dismissed by the Chairman; then by petition to the Supreme Court. (No. 10484). A general rule of reviewal of the whole record and that the highest grade of each of the 14 legal subjects of the examination only be recognized (like ethics) if an examinee has taken the Bar examination two or more times, if consecutive, was proposed. It was submitted that this proposal was reasonable, fair and fulfilled the intent of the Rules. It was denied without opinion.

Only after the July 1971 examination did he submit a formal petition to the Committee for review of his examination papers as provided by the Rules. Eighty days thereafter, on December 24, 1971, a summary dismissal was received. He then petitioned (certified record file No. S.B.-10) the Supreme Court on January 11, 1972, alleging Committee denial of his United States Constitutional rights of Due Process and Equal Protection of the Fourteenth Amendment referring to news media publications which manifested a Negro extra consideration policy declared by the Chairman, wherein, Negroes only, would be passed at an arbitrary, lower standard than all other examinees. This policy was deemed offensively discriminatory. Also, it was alleged that part of the Rule concerning denial of a petition was unconstitutional, since a minority of the

Committee could deny a formal petition. An oral hearing before the Court was held one week later. The Chairman was conspicuously absent. The Vice Chairman was the respondent which was without precedent. Further, no written response was ordered or submitted as required by the Rules or as established by precedence for this type of hearing. The petition was denied without opinion on January 18, 1972.

On January 21, 1972 a transcript of a failing Negro examinee's evidentiary hearing of September 3, 1971 became accessible. This had been a closed hearing. The factual setting of the hearing and his final record were on "all fours" to your Petitioner's case. The testimonial evidence by four Committee members acted as an adhesive to affix pieces of other evidentiary matters into a completed puzzle. Based upon this new probative evidence of purposeful race and/or color favoritism treatment practices, a timely request was made for a rehearing. A motion for reconsideration was granted without oral argument and a Committee response ordered. Said response from the Chairman, not the Vice Chairman, stated that your Petitioner was not disadvantaged due to the Negro only policy because he formally petitioned after the July 1971 examination results were public, so his papers received the same attention as did Negroes who had their papers especially reviewed before public announcement of the successful examinees. Said response completely ignored the fact that the Negro policy was adopted and was effective to the July 1970 examination; that said policy was applied to the February 1971 examination; that he did not formally petition after these examinations; and that

other non-Negroid failing examinees did not formally petition after the three examinations in point. Further, said response expressly and impliedly stated that the Committee had a "concern" that Negroes have reason to suspect discrimination in our legal system, therefore special Negro reconsideration using a lower final grade standard was justifiable and demanded to preclude any claim of discrimination. Also, that an obligation to admit more Negroes to the Bar was mandated to avoid exacerbating racial tensions and to prevent current disorders in judicial proceedings. (See certified record Reply.)

The legal proceedings which unveiled the Committee secret Negro grade review policy were as follows: A Negro, Charles S. Murray, a former classmate, took the same Bar examinations as your Petitioner and failed each time. After the February 1971 examination, Mr. Murry petitioned the Supreme Court claiming discrimination against Negroes by the Committee (certified record file No. 10563). Prior to his hearing on July 13, 1971 a Committee affidavit response stated that discrimination against Negroes was not possible because a special segregated Negro grade review policy which affected all failing Negro papers, regardless of the severity of the failing grades, became effective with the July 1970 examination. (All non-Negroid examinees with grades below "something above 68.0" percent were never reviewed.) At the Murry Hearing, (certified record label) before the Court, the Chairman admitted the favoritism Negro review policy was wrongful when he said: "Perhaps wrongfully, at least from the standpoint of the Whites, it was wrongful." Further, the Chairman admitted that a Negro, Mr. Bursh, was rec-

ommended to the Bar after the July 1970 examination utilizing a standard of "sufficient quality" of his answers despite his failing grade, which impliedly was "somewhere above 68.0" percent "or a little less" and only by resort to the Negro special review policy. Next, the Court scheduled an evidentiary hearing on September 3, 1971. A master, former Superior Court Judge, Thomas Tang, who presided over said hearing (certified record label, Tang Hearing) determined there was no discrimination against Mr. Murry, because Negroes were donees of favoritism reconsideration. The transcript of said hearing, not accessible until January 21, 1972 unequivocally evidences Committee racial bias statements and practices. The Negro only policy excluded other so-called "minorities", such as American Indians, Mexican-Americans, Swedish-Americans as well as other acredited law school examinee race, color, creed and sex groups. When confronted with the unfairness and inequality of said policy, the Chairman admitted that maybe it was done impulsively, that maybe it was a mistake, and that continuance was very debatable, one year or three examinations after the fact. On September 29, 1971 the Court denied Mr. Murry's petition; thereafter his file without the evidentiary hearing transcript, was open to the public.]

By utilizing the foregoing facts, inter alia, your Petitioner submitted that he would have been unequivocably mentally qualified to be admitted to the State Bar if the same standard, applicable to Negroes only, beginning with the July 1970 examination would have been equally relevant to any of his three examinations in point. He, also, submitted that the grade review proceedings mani-

fested a lack of good faith; that said review proceedings were a sham, a nullity, and unconstitutional to petitioner and all failing non-Negroids.

He further established arbitrary, capricious practices of the Committee by citing a former Committee member's letter of August 3, 1970 to the Chairman which admits automatically passing all examinees in the past at 69.0 or 69.3 percent level because "there could have been a 1 percent error in grading" (certified record file No. 10076). Also, he argued, without denial by the Committee, that other special failing examinees, who formally petitioned after grade announcement were given favorable reconsideration because one was a licensed attorney from another State; one was a Captain in the Air Force; and one was a female Negro attorney, despite all three having grades below your Petitioner's July 1971 examination grade (i.e., 69.3, 69.1, 69.3, respectively, compared to his 69.5 percent).

Finally, he stated without equivocation, that if he had known of the favoritism racial policy following the July 1970 examination; that if he had known the Committee used the Rules of the Supreme Court as "our guidelines", he would not have entered into an agreement to take the two succeeding examinations. Also, that he has been irreparably injured from detrimentally relying upon the examination and admission proceedings being administered equally and fairly when, in fact, they were not.

REASONS WHY CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED

By virture of the Rules of the Supreme Court, Rules 27(b), 28(a), and 28(c), as amended, the

Committee on Examinations and Admissions of the Supreme Court is an administrative agency of the Court, appointed by the Court, which executes the rules of admission promulgated by the Court; whereas the office of the State Bar, a public corporation (A. R. S. 32-201) is entrusted with the clerical duties for said Committee, Rules 27(f), 28(c), II, as amended. In this context, the Committee, on its own motion, secretly determined an especial classification of failing accredited law school examinees based upon race and/or color. Whether State appointed authorities or agents shall be permitted to subdivide the restrictive accredited law school examinee classification, Rule 28(c), IV, cl. 6; Hackin v. Lockwood, 361 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1966), by race and/or color; whether such secret final grade review segregation of the examination papers was grossly unfair, unequal, invidiously discriminatory and shocking to the universal sense of justice; and whether a standard of "sufficient quality" of answers is vague, arbitrary and capricious as it applied to only Negro failing examinees, frames the main issues.

Beginning with Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307, 310 (1879), the Court commanded that the Fourteenth Amendment was to be construed liberally; that "(T)he law in the States shall be the same for the black as for the white; that all persons whether colored or white shall stand equal before the laws of the States,"; and that "Its (the Fourteenth Amendment) aim was against discrimination because of race or color." Next, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118, U.S. 356, 369 (1886), applied the law when the Court said: "(E)qual protection of the laws is a pledge of

protection of equal laws." Also, that "For, the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. at 370. In a transportation case, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), the Court declared the "Separate but Equal" doctrine. It was overruled in the field of public education by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), when the Court held there can be no intentional race or color segregation based upon the premise that separate but equal is not equal, the moment you divide people, that is the moment you create inequality. Finally, Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) in a Title VII case held that "(T)he Act does not command that any person be hired simply because he was formerly the subject of discrimination or because he is a member of a minority group. Discriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed." and that racial discrimination is invidious discrimination. Another definition of invidious discrimination appears in Sander v. Gray, 203 F. Supp. 158, 168 (1962) wherein the Court said: Unlike per se invidiousness, springing from discrimination based on race, color or creed, we must deal here with discrimination not so infected." See also Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, infra, 353 U.S. at 239.

Inasmuch as the Committee offered no legal authority for the establishment of the double standard Bar examination passing grade level following the segregation of examination papers by

race and/or color, it can be stated that this is contrariwise to Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.(1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803), in which the Court said our government is "termed a government of laws, not of men"; therefore, the Committee action represents government by whim which is the very antithesis of due process. McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 250 (1971), (dissenting opinion).

The Arizona Bar examination is essentially a culture-free test. It is rationally related to knowledge obtained from three years study at an accredited law school and is designed to determine if all accredited law school graduate examinees, who are then under like circumstances, are legally competent to practice law. In Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238,239 (1957), the Court said: "A State cannot exclude a person from the practice of law . . . in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (4 citations). . . . A State can require high standards of qualification, such as . . . proficiency in its law, . . . but any qualification must have a rational connection with the applicant's . . . capacity to practice law. (3 citations). . . . Even in applying permissible standards, officers of a State cannot exclude an applicant . . . when their action is invidiously discriminatory. (citation)." Petitioner contends that based upon the aforementioned cases, his property right, the right to practice law, Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1, 8, (1971), was unconscionably abridged; because he did not receive the same timely especial treatment as Negroes; because he and other non-Negroids, similarly situated, had examination grades equal to or higher than the Negro standard established at the time of the 1970 (July) examina-

tion; and because the racial segregation of Negro examination papers was for the express purpose of rendering favoritism treatment. Therefore, your Petitioner and other non-Negroids were victims of invidious discrimination that is forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 548 (1971), (dissenting opinion); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 483 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969); Loving v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192, 193 (1964); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. at 239; South v. Peter, 339 U.S. 276, 281 (1950), (dissenting opinion); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 21 (1948); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1941); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. at 373, 374. A statement by Douglas, J., dissenting in South v. Peter, 339 U.S. at 279, considered appropriate to the case at bar was: "The creation by law of favored groups of citizens and the grant to them of preferred political rights is the worst of all discriminations under a democratic system of goverment", a fortiori, when a race, color, creed or sex group receives favoritism reconsideration in a Bar examination grade review; then said group, or part thereof, is recommended to the Bar by resort to an arbitrary passing standard. See also Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944).

Further, the statement "(O)ur system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness", In re Murcheson, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955), does not equate with the segregation Negro policy, nor the former automatic admission policy of examinees with grades of 69.0 or 69.3 percent, nor the lack of a good faith agree-

ment with the Committee because the conditions or rules of the agreement were used only as guidelines by the Committee. Pertinent to the foregoing is the Court's statement that "Law is something more than mere will asserted as an act of power. It must be not a special rule for a particular person or a particular case.". Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884).

It is fundamental to our system of freedom or democracy that a majority vote or more is required to decide the issues of our society or our government, if constitutional. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60(1917), Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1927). Contrary to this established principle, Rule 28(c), XII, E permits three of seven Committee members to deny a formal petition presented to the Committee. The certified record Motion for Reconsideration, evidences that even one Committee member can deny a formal petition. On its face, this rule, its actual application, is not within the "four corners" of our Constitution. "When the Government exacts . . . much, the importance of fair, even handed, and uniform decision making is obviously intensified." Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 455 (1971). How does the Committee justify its arbitrary favorable decisions concerning the failing examinees who formally petitioned? e.g., Application of Heaney, 476 P.2d 846 (1970) (Admitted to Bar on January 19, 1971).

Is there now a beginning of Black justice and White justice? The Committee, on its motion, has promulgated this unwritten rule of law in Bar examinations in Arizona. What will be their next "concern" in dispensing thei- "indiscriminate imposition of inequalities"? Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. at 22. How pervasive or contagious will

this infected policy be upon other disciplines of life, particularly, when it has been publicized and criticized by the news media, but to no avail? The "Black power" pressures of the past and present exerted on society and the government at the local, state and national levels have oftentimes been warranted to obtain equality of the laws, but countervailing forces are inevitable if it is established that non-Blacks are being deprived of life, liberty and property due to especial treatment or lower professional licensing standards applying to Blacks only, as in this case. It is sincerely believed the foregoing manifests an unbelieveable and unconscionable set of circumstances which present substantial federal questions. Railroad Com. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, a writ of certiorari should issue to review the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona.

Respectfully submitted,

William Jacob Johnson

WILLIAM JACOB JOHNSON, pro se
1604 East Fremont Drive
Tempe, Arizona 85282

April 19, 1972

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

Petitioner,

vs.

Respondent.

No. SP 10

ORDER SETTING TIME

FOR HEARING PETITION

The Petitioner in the above entitled matter, having filed a Petition for Special Action,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: that the informal hearing for said petition is set on Tuesday, the 18 day of January, 1972, at the hour of 10:00 o'clock a.m., before this Court in the Supreme Court Hearing Room in the City of Phoenix, Arizona, or as soon thereafter as the same can be heard.

DATED this 11th day of January, 1972.

Chief Justice

Supreme Court

STATE OF ARIZONA

Phoenix

85007

January 19, 1972

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF

WILLIAM JACOB JOHNSON

TO BE ADMITTED AS A MEMBER OF THE STATE BAR OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA,

Petitioner,

Supreme Court
No. SB-10

The following action was taken by the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona on January 18, 1972 in regard to the above-entitled cause:

"ORDERED: The Court denies application."

CLIFFORD H. WARD, Clerk

By Mary Ann Hopkins
Deputy Clerk

TO: William Jacob Johnson, 1604 East Fremont Drive, Tempe, Arizona 85282
George Read Carlock, Esquire, Committee on Examinations and Admissions, 858 Security Building, Phoenix, Arizona 85004
Eldon Husted, Executive Director, State Bar of Arizona, 858 Security Building, Phoenix, Arizona 85004

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF WILLIAM JACOB JOHNSON TO BE ADMITTED AS A MEMBER OF THE STATE BAR OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA Petitioner.	NO. SB-10 O R D E R

IT IS ORDERED granting the applicant herein to and including February 8, 1972, to file a Motion for Reconsideration; Committee on Examinations and Admissions of the State Bar of Arizona has fifteen (15) days thereafter in which to file a Response to said Motion.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no further oral argument will be granted.

DATED this 25th day of January, 1972.

Jack D. H. Hays
Chief Justice

cc: William Jacob Johnson
George Read Carlock
State Bar of Arizona

App. 3

FILED
JAN 25 1972
CLIFFORD H. WARD
CLERK SUPREME COURT
BY

Supreme Court

STATE OF ARIZONA

Phoenix

85007

March 1, 1972

In The Matter Of The Application Of

WILLIAM JACOB JOHNSON

To Be Admitted As A Member Of The State Bar Of The State Of Arizona.

Supreme Court
No. SB-10

The following action was taken by the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona on February 29, 1972 in regard to the above-entitled cause:

"ORDERED: Motion for Reconsideration - DENIED."

CLIFFORD H. WARD, Clerk

By Mary Ann Hopkins
Deputy Clerk

TO: William Jacob Johnson, 1604 East Fremont Drive, Tempe, Arizona 85282
George Read Carlock, Esquire, Committee on Examinations and Admissions, 858 Security Building, Phoenix, Arizona 85004
Eldon Husted, Executive Director, State Bar of Arizona, 858 Security Building, Phoenix, Arizona 85004